

High Growth and High Saving Rates – A Relative Answer to the Puzzle *

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Abstract

Prolonged rapid growth, i.e. a “catching-up” process, is known to be accompanied by high rates of national saving. This paper examines the ability of a life-cycle model to explain this observed phenomenon. The life-cycle model is integrated with three additional elements: uncertainty about future growth, credit constraints, and utility from relative consumption. The different effects of these elements on the relation between growth and saving in the context of the life-cycle model are compared. I find that while growth uncertainty and credit constraints each greatly enhance the life cycle model’s ability to explain the high saving rates accompanying rapid growth, only the element of utility from relative consumption allows the model to replicate the observed phenomena of a correlation between the aggregate growth rate and the household expenditure growth rate over the life cycle and a consumption-age cross sectional distribution that is largely invariant to aggregate growth.

Keywords: Life Cycle, Saving Growth, Open Economy Growth, Household Saving, Life Cycle Models and Saving, Relative Income Hypothesis

JEL Classification Numbers: D91, E21, F43, O11.

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1 Introduction

The phenomenon of high saving rates accompanying rapid growth is well known in the economic literature. Modigliani (1970) notes it with relation to post world-war II Europe. More recently it is usually identified with the rapidly growing Asian economies. Deaton and Paxson (2000) state, based on cross-country evidence, that a one percent increase in per-capita growth is accompanied by a two percent increase in the saving rate.

However, standard infinite horizon representative agent models predict the opposite - the higher is the expected growth, the more is the agent to borrow. In the international context, this means that a relatively poor but rapidly developing country is supposed to run trade deficits, essentially borrowing from rich countries at the expense of its future wealth. The opposite is often observed in reality.

It has been suggested that it is the higher propensity to save that is causing the higher growth, a-là a Solow style model. However, as Carroll and Weil (1994) and Andersson (1999) show, it is higher growth that precedes higher saving rates and not the other way around; hence it is more likely that causality runs from growth to saving. While a positive causality from saving to growth cannot be ruled out,¹ clearly the saving decision must be optimal given growth expectations. Since much of the greater saving-to-GDP ratio is attributed to higher household saving rates,² than the question of saving-rate optimality should be discussed from the household's perspective, rather than some central planner's.

Another suggested explanation is that both saving and growth are both attributable to some cultural characteristics. For example, the rapid growth and high saving rates in East Asia can be the result of Confucian values shared by many countries in that region. This line of argument fails, however, to account for several facts. First, high saving rates have historically accompanied prolonged rapid growth (a “catching-up” process) in many

¹For example, Aghion et al. (2006) suggest a model in which domestic savings allow domestic banks to co-finance foreign technologically advanced investment and thus foster growth.

²For example, Ando and Kennickell (1986) find that during the high-growth period in Japan, households in all age groups there were saving much more than their US counterparts. Chamon and Prasad (2010) show a rapid increase in the Chinese household saving rate over the last several decades.

countries across the world. This phenomenon has been seen in post world-war II Europe, in Japan, the four tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Singapore), in Ireland, Chile, and more recently in Vietnam and India. Second, as discussed above, saving increases following a rise in growth. Why then have Confucian values not made households save in high rates all along? Finally, Carroll et al. (1994) and Carroll et al. (1999) look at the effect of cultural background on saving behavior among immigrants, and do not find a correlation with the saving rates at the countries of origin. Therefore, it seems appropriate to investigate the growth-saving correlation in generality, and not to relegate it to cultural attributes.

Modigliani (1966) attempts to explain the causality from growth to saving using a life-cycle model. The intuition behind this explanation is simple: since it is the young that save (toward retirement) and the old that dissave (being retired), growth, making the young richer compared to the old, should raise the saving rate. However, as Tobin (1967) and Carroll and Summers (1991) note, this explanation requires that growth increases income from cohort (age group) to cohort, but not within a cohort (i.e. growth does not affect an existing agent's lifetime income, but rather increases the lifetime income of a "newborn" agent with respect to the previous-generation agent), otherwise the young, expecting higher future income, would lose their motivation to save. Carroll and Summers (1991) bring evidence to refute this assumption (i.e. they show that growth increases the income of people of all ages), and argue that this invalidates Modigliani's life-cycle explanation completely. Another attempt to explain this direction of causality is made by Carroll and Weil (1994) and Carroll et al. (2000), using a habit formation mechanism.³ While habit formation may indeed create a positive relation from growth to saving, by shifting consumption to the future (where the agent is more "spoiled"), examining Chinese data, Chamon and Prasad (2010) find no evidence of it.

In addition to its effect on the saving rate, rapid growth seems to have two more effects, closely related to each other: In Carroll and Summers (1991), the authors also find that

³The latter paper also contains an illuminating literature review of the topic.

households in rapidly growing countries experience a higher rate of increase in their consumption expenditure compared to their peers in lower growth countries. This phenomenon, also observed in Lee et al. (2006), which Carroll et al. (2000) seek to explain with habit formation, is also inconsistent with the standard PIH and life cycle models.⁴ A second related phenomenon, observed in Carroll and Summers (1991), is that the cross-sectional profile of consumption by age is quite similar across countries with very different aggregate growth rates.

This paper attempts to quantify and measure the ability of a life-cycle model to generate the following three stylized facts: one, a positive relation from aggregate growth to the aggregate saving ratio (with growth fully affecting individual cohorts); two, a correlation between the aggregate growth rate and the household expenditure growth rate over the life cycle; and three, a consumption-age cross sectional distribution that is largely invariant to aggregate growth.

Furthermore, this paper looks at the effect of augmenting the life-cycle model with three elements - uncertainty about future growth, credit constraints and utility from relative consumption (also known as “keeping up with the Joneses”) - can substantially strengthen its ability to generate the stylized facts. I find that while growth uncertainty and credit constraints each greatly enhance the life cycle model’s ability to explain the first stylized fact, high saving rates accompanying rapid growth, only the element of utility from relative consumption allows the model to replicate the other two: the rapid increase of consumption expenditure over the household life-cycle and the stability of the consumption-age cross section, observed in growing economies.

Section 2 presents the life-cycle model used. Sections 3, 4 and 5 respectively describe the modeling of growth uncertainty, credit constraints, and utility from relative consumption. The respective foci of sections 6 and 7 are the calibration and simulation of the model. Section 8 concludes.

⁴If interest rates in rapidly growing countries were higher than in comparable slow growing ones, this could have explained this phenomenon. However, that is not the case.

2 The Life-cycle Model

The demand side of the economy is represented by a household life-cycle model. Each period t one household is created and one is destroyed. Each household exists for J periods, so that there exists one household for each household age j from one to J . Each household has the following identical lifetime utility function:

$$U = \sum_{j=1}^J \beta^{j-1} u(c_j, j), \quad (1)$$

where c_j , abbreviated from $u(j, t, g, r)$ for convenience, is the consumption of a household at age j at time t , under growth rate g and interest rate r . The household's within-period utility varies with age, and is of the following form:

$$u(j, c_j) = q(j) \frac{c_j^{1-\theta} - 1}{1-\theta}, \quad (2)$$

where $q(j)$ is what shall be referred to as the “life-cycle multiplier”, putting weights on utility in different periods in the household's life cycle. This is an element that is often thought of as the average number of equivalent adults for household age j .⁵ I will refer to the path of the life-cycle multiplier over the life of the household as the “household regime” (i.e. $\{q(j)\}_{j=1}^J$).

The demographic transition that typically takes place over the development process may also affect the households' saving decisions. One could argue, for example, that since we observe the average number of children per household diminishes with economic modernization, the household regime should vary with the level of development. In addition, changes in birth rates would also lead to changes in the elderly support ratio. Another example is the effect of development on the norm, common in many developing countries, of elderly parents moving in with their children. There is firm evidence that prolonged development, such as discussed in this paper, lowers the rate in which this phenomenon takes place.⁶ Thus a

⁵See, for example, Tobin (1967), Modigliani (1970, 1986), Mariger (1987) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).

⁶See UN (2005).

young person expecting long term growth should not overly rely on the support of his or her children after retirement. Curtis et al. (2011) argue that these demographics changes play a large role in explaining the increase in the Chinese household saving rate. While that may be the case in China, the phenomenon of high growth and high saving rates has occurred in different countries with different demographic compositions. Therefore, this paper abstracts away from this element. In light of the above, and following evidence (discussed in Section 6) that the consumption-age profile is very stable, I assume the household regime to be time invariant.

The household's effective labor units, l , are assumed to change over the household's age, j . This is attributed to changes in experience, improved position in the workplace, as well as physical and mental abilities varying with age. I assume the total number of effective units of labor at the economy to be constant at unity:

$$\sum_{j=1}^J l(j) = 1. \quad (3)$$

The household's labor income over the life-cycle is therefore dependent upon household age j and the prevailing wage per effective unit of labor at the time period, $W(t, g)$:

$$w(j, t, g) = l(j)W(t, g), \quad (4)$$

where $w(j, t, g)$ is the labor income of a household of age j at time t under a prevailing constant growth rate of g . $W(t, g)$ is growing at rate g , hence growth fully affects the household's labor income over the life cycle (i.e. the "life cycle income effect"). Thus this model is not subject to the Carroll and Summers (1991) critique.

Under the assumption that the economy is small and open to capital flows,⁷ so that the interest rate, r , is exogenous, discounted lifetime income is:

⁷This assumption seems appropriate for countries starting out on the development path. It may become less appropriate as the economy grows, as it may reach a size sufficient to influence international capital markets. This paper abstracts away from such situations in the interest of simplicity.

$$\Omega(t, g, r) = \sum_{j=1}^J (1+r)^{-j+1} w(j, t+j-1, g) = \sum_{j=1}^J (1+r)^{-j+1} l(j)W(t+j-1, g). \quad (5)$$

The discounted lifetime consumption expenditure of a household created at time t in an economy with a constant growth rate of g and with an international interest rate r is:

$$C(t, g, r) = \sum_{j=1}^J (1+r)^{-j+1} c_j. \quad (6)$$

Each individual household is thus facing the following utility maximization problem at the time of its creation:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \sum_{j=1}^J \beta^{j-1} q(j) \frac{c_j^{1-\theta} - 1}{1-\theta} \\ \text{s.t.} \\ C(t, g, r) = \Omega(t, g, r), \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where the households optimize their respective consumption streams under the constraint of their lifetime labor income.

3 Uncertainty of Future Growth

In Section 2 the households are assumed to know with certainty that growth will continue at a constant rate throughout their lifetime. While, barring a major catastrophe, the fluctuation in lifetime income an average household in the developed world can expect are relatively mild, that may not be the case for a household in a rapidly developing country.⁸ Such a country is in a process of catching up to the developed world “frontier”, and is able to grow rapidly by adopting existing technologies and practices. It is, however, bound to run out of such technologies once it reaches the development frontier. Its growth rate should

⁸This model has no idiosyncratic shocks. Such shocks, assuming that they are not influenced by the rate of growth, are unlikely to explain the higher rate of saving in a rapidly growing economy.

then slow down and be in line with the rest of the developed countries. Such a stop can be abrupt (e.g. Japan) or slow and gradual (e.g. Hong-Kong and Singapore). It is in fact very difficult to establish the point in which a country fulfills its economic potential and reaches the frontier.

In addition, it is also possible for a country to drop out of the catching-up process altogether (without reaching the development frontier). After all, as Parente and Prescott (1993) note, the vast majority of developing countries are not in the process of catching up. Being the exception rather than the rule, one can certainly imagine that this process may stop or be derailed; that the unique circumstances causing it may change, or put differently, that whatever factor that was holding the country back to begin with may return. The catching up process might depend on a unique political situation, on geopolitical stability, on the state of the world economy or even on natural events (rainfall, flooding etc.). The effect of the 1997 Asian crisis on some of the local economies is a possible example of such a case, as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have yet to regain the levels of growth enjoyed pre-crisis.

While we do see several countries that are enjoying or have enjoyed a fairly stable stretch of rapid growth over several decades, it may be that their success was far from certain ex-ante. For example, a Japanese household living during the second half of the 20th century had no way of knowing how long would rapid growth continue, and had to take the eventuality of an abrupt stop at any point in time into consideration when making its saving decisions.

Given all of the above, it seems fit to introduce uncertainty into the model. This is done in the following fashion: Each period, all households perceive a risk of constant probability λ for the country to drop out of its high growth regime (where it grows at rate g_H) into an absorbing low growth regime (where growth equals g_L).⁹ This drop is considered to be permanent by all existing households (the country will grow slowly for the rest of their lives). This can be formulated in the form of a Bellman equation:

⁹It is reasonable to believe that λ should actually become higher as the country approaches the development frontier. I abstract away from such variations in λ for simplicity.

$$V^H(a_j, j) = \max_{c_j} u(c_j, j) + \beta \{ \lambda V^L(a_{j+1}, j+1) + (1-\lambda)V^H(a_{j+1}, j+1) \} \quad (8)$$

$$s.t. \quad a_{j+1} = (a_j + w_j - c_j)(1+r), \quad a_{J+1} = 0, \quad (9)$$

where a is asset stock, j is household age, and:

$$V^L(a_j, j) = \max_{c_t} \sum_{t=j}^J \beta^{t-j} u(c_t, t), \quad (10)$$

$$s.t. \quad \sum_{t=j}^J (1+r)^{j-t} c_t = a_j + \sum_{t=j}^J (1+r)^{j-t} l(t) W(j) (1+g_L)^{t-j}. \quad (11)$$

However, since it is the rapid growth scenario that is of interest here, the households pleasantly discover each period that the high growth regime is still in effect. Thus they re-optimize their consumption decisions each period. The effect of this form of uncertainty is that lifetime wealth is gradually realized to be higher than expected over the household lifetime, and the consumption profile is constantly updated upwards. This effect is obviously stronger the higher is the high regime's growth rate compared to that of the low regime.

Equations 8 to 10 lead to the following Euler equation:

$$u_c(c_j^H, j) = (1+r)\beta \left\{ \frac{\lambda u_c(c_{j+1}^L, j+1)}{(1+\phi_L)^{1-\gamma}} + \frac{(1-\lambda)u_c(c_{j+1}^H, j+1)}{(1+\phi_H)^{1-\gamma}} \right\}, \quad (12)$$

where c_{j+1}^H is the optimal consumption choice at period $j+1$ given that the high growth regime remains in effect, and c_{j+1}^L is optimal consumption given a regime switch to low growth at period $j+1$.

4 Credit Constraints

Rapid growth creates a great disparity in terms of lifetime wealth between younger and older cohorts in the economy. This disparity is so substantial that the saving decisions of older generations become negligible, and aggregate saving behavior is determined almost entirely by younger generations. Modigliani (1970) argues that this disparity should increase the aggregate saving rate, as the young save (for retirement) and the old dissave (during retirement). Carroll and Summers (1991) argue that growth affects the future income of the younger cohorts, therefore causing them to save less and even dissave at the expense of future income, reducing the aggregate saving rate (i.e. what I refer to as the “life cycle income effect”).

Paramount to the latter is the ability of the younger cohorts to take advantage of their high future income through borrowing. Such borrowing, however, would put these cohorts in the realm of negative asset value. This raises the issue of incentives to default on debt through bankruptcy for the individual household (when the cost of bankruptcy is lower than the debt itself), and the possibility of aggregate risk to lending institutions under growth uncertainty - if the entire economy switches into a low growth regime, a large portion of indebted households may find their future income much lower compared to their current debt, and default, bankrupting the lending institutions in the process.

A possible implication of these issues is a credit constraint, preventing the households from borrowing too much at the expense of the future, and restricting the dissaving of the young cohorts. As Jappelli and Pagano (1994) show, using a three period overlapping generations model, a credit constraint may raise the saving rate and strengthen the effect of growth on saving.

In this paper I use the following credit constraint formulation:

$$a_j \geq \kappa \Omega_j, \tag{13}$$

where Ω_j is expected discounted future labor income, so that:

$$\Omega_j = \sum_{t=j}^J (1+r)^{j-t} E_j[w_t], \quad (14)$$

and κ is some number between 0 (a non-negativity constraint) and -1 (no constraint).

The value of κ may reflect the strength and accessibility of the financial system, as well as intergenerational lending. Since the ability of individuals to amass debt is very limited even in developed economies, one would expect a κ near zero to be a reasonable approximation. A possible caveat, however, is that intergenerational transfers (such as bequests) could move young households away from the credit constraints and allow a dissaving pattern similar to the unconstrained case.

I use the algorithm detailed in Mariger (1987) to compute consumption paths given credit constraints.

5 Relative Consumption

The role of relative consumption has long been a topic of economic discussion, as evidenced by Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949). In a finding known as the ‘Easterlin paradox’, Easterlin (1974) observes that while the rich are generally happier than the poor within a given country, average happiness in rich countries is not greater than in poor ones, and economic growth does not seem to increase average happiness over time. More recently, Luttmer (2005) finds that higher levels of consumption by neighbors lead to lower reported household happiness levels. In addition, Gruber (2012) finds relative wealth to be a central determinant of household saving behavior in China, and Jin et al. (2011) find that local inequality increases household saving rates, also for China.

Can a utility function using relative consumption account for households with relatively higher income saving more? Consider the following function, based on the Galí (1994)

formulation, for the household's within-period utility:¹⁰

$$u(j, c_j, \bar{c}_{t,g}) = q(j) \frac{c_j^{1-\theta} \bar{c}_{t,g}^{\gamma\theta}}{1-\theta}. \quad (15)$$

c_j , as noted in Section 2, is the consumption of a household of age j at time t , given growth rate g and a constant international interest rate r . $\bar{c}_{t,g}$ is the average household consumption at time t given growth rate g , and γ is assumed to be between zero and one. $q(j)$ is the household regime, as detailed in Section 2

This formulation yields the following Euler equation:

$$c_{t+1} = \left[\frac{q(t+1)}{q(t)} (1+r)\beta \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta}} (1+g)^\gamma c_t \quad (16)$$

As Harbaugh (1996) and Carroll et al. (1997) discuss, a relative consumption element may generate a causal relation from economic growth to the saving rate. As equation 16 demonstrates, with economic growth, the surrounding average level of consumption is constantly rising, and the agent's optimal consumption path is exponentially increasing. This trend places the bulk of consumption later in life, when income is low (due to retirement), thus necessitating more saving earlier.

6 Calibration

In order to examine the actual impact of adding the previously described elements on the ability of the life cycle model to explain the positive correlation of growth and saving, the parameters of the model need to first be calibrated. Of these parameters, some have fairly accepted values (or ranges) in the economic literature (e.g. α , β and θ), while others are more elusive (e.g. $q(j)$ and $l(j)$). For the former, I simply use values within the common ranges, as follows:

¹⁰I choose this formulation for its elegance. However, other habit formulations, such as in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), would generate similar dynamics.

Parameter	Value
T (length of household lifecycle)	55
θ (consumption utility risk averseness coefficient)	4
α (Cobb-Douglas capital intensity)	0.33
β (time preference)	0.95
δ (depreciation rate)	0.05
r (international real interest rate)	5%

Table 1: Calibration of Model Parameters

In addition, the life cycle parameters need to be calibrated. I calibrate these using US data. The reason for using US data, rather than data from a rapidly growing country, is to avoid the suspicion that there is something special about such a country’s income and/or consumption age profile that would generate an saving behavior different than that of other countries. My calibration strategy for $q(j)$ and $l(j)$ is detailed below.

Time periods are measured in years. Households are assumed to exist for 55 years (approximately ages 25 to 80).¹¹

Using the fact that $c(j, t, g, r) = c(j, (t - j + 1) + j - 1, g, r)$, $q(j)$, the household’s life-cycle multiplier, can be backed out of actual household consumption data, assuming that $1 + r \approx \frac{1}{\beta}$.¹² First, the equation is rewritten in matrix form:

$$C_t = X \cdot q / (Y_t q), \quad (17)$$

where ‘ \cdot ’ denotes pointwise (element by element, or Hadamard) multiplication and ‘ $/$ ’ denotes pointwise division.

$C_t(j)$ is the consumption share of cohort j at period t , $X(j) = (1 + g)^{-j+1}$, and $Y_t(i, j) = (1 + r)^{-j+1}$.

In other words, the model attributes consumption variation across cohorts to the different

¹¹This assumption may seem somewhat problematic, considering the changes in longevity and social structure that come hand in hand with economic development. However, I believe it to still be a good approximation: while life expectancy is lower in less developed countries, the differences conditional on fact that the individual has reached adulthood and was able to create an independent household are smaller.

¹²A small open economy assumption.

values of $q(j)$ as well as growth.¹³ Equation 17 above can be rewritten in the following form:

$$C_t/X_t \iota' \cdot Y_t q = q, \quad (18)$$

where ι is a $J \times 1$ vector of ones.

Thus q is simply the first eigenvector of the matrix $C_t/X_t \cdot Y_t$.

I turn to US Consumer Expenditure (CE) survey data on household consumption, years 1984-2005.¹⁴ As can be seen in figure 6, consumption patterns in the data remain very consistent over the years.¹⁵ Normalizing the data from different years to get consumption shares, averaging between the years, and using a cubic spline extrapolation (raised to the power of θ), gives an approximation of $q(j)$, which is then normalized to sum up to unity.

The resulting household regime is hump shaped, peaking when the age of the household head is around 50 (this corresponds to household age 25). This estimation is using only US data, and cannot be claimed to be an accurate representation of life cycle consumption preferences elsewhere. However, its hump shaped result has a general ring of truth to it: we would generally expect a household to require relatively little consumption starting out, as it is composed of just two young individuals. As the household expands, so do its needs - a larger family requires more food, clothing and living space. Consumption generally peaks as the younger generation is preparing, through education and/or acquiring initial property, to establish its own independent household. Later on, as the children leave, the parents can cut down on consumption. As the household draws near to its end, a possible death of a spouse can further decrease consumption. While such regimes are most likely not identical between countries, they nonetheless seem to be broadly similar.

¹³It is worth noting that other elements, (i.e. growth uncertainty, credit constraints and utility from relative consumption), can cause and/or influence the cohort consumption distribution. Since the calibration is using US data for periods averaging about 2% annual per capita growth, then as will be demonstrated in Section 7, these elements should not have a substantial influence.

¹⁴According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators, the average US real interest rate was just over 5% in this period, making the approximation of $(1+r)\beta \approx 1$ very good for a β value of 0.95.

¹⁵This is in line with the findings of Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) and Ando and Kennickell (1986) with respect to the US and Japan.




Figure 1: Calibrating the household regime, the weighting (q) on the household consumption utility by period

Having experimented with a variety of household regimes, I find that, save for extreme and unreasonable cases, using different household regimes of the general bell shape described above does not affect results substantially.

Calibrating $l(j)$, the effective labor units of the household over its life-cycle, is even more straight forward: I again use US Consumer Expenditure survey data (years 1984-2005) on the wage income of different household cohorts to extrapolate the household's lifetime wage path. The calibration is presented in figure 2.

The hump shape of the estimated effective labor units over the life cycle is not surprising: effective labor units increase with age, likely due to experience and acquired position, peaking, much like the household regime, around the household head age of 50. They then start to fall rapidly, likely due to retirement and natural physical deterioration.

Notice that this formulation implicitly implies that the distribution of effective labor units over the life cycle is unaffected by growth. However, this may not be the case in reality, as the rapid technological changes associated with high growth rates may favor young workers, capable of quick learning and adjustment, over their older, more experienced counterparts. That being said, this aspect of the labor market is not explored in this paper.

Another caveat is the suspicion that surveys overstate average labor income for the last age bracket, since the number of observations for that category drops considerably, possibly causing a selection bias. It is likely that the drop in sample size is partly due to retirement, making the actual average labor income much lower, and thus causing an underestimation of household saving and the effect of growth. I choose not to try to adjust for that bias in order to avoid any suspicion that the results presented later are due to an over-correction on my part.




Figure 2: The household's effective labor units (l) over the life cycle

7 Simulation

7.1 The Life Cycle Baseline Model

The baseline model has balanced growth ($\gamma = 1$), no uncertainty ($\lambda = 0$) and no credit constraints ($\kappa = -1$). As figure 3 demonstrates, this simple life cycle model does generate a positive relation from growth to saving for the 0% to 4% per capita growth interval. However, slightly after 4% the relation becomes negative, with the saving rate at 9% roughly equal to that of 0%. This result is not in accordance with the data, which does not show the growth saving relation becoming negative.

In conjunction with the investment line, this saving curve predicts a positive current account for economies in the growth range of roughly 1% to 5% (for the given international interest rate and depreciation rate).

Breaking down the aggregate effect to the household level, we can see that growth causes the younger cohorts to dissave, much like the Carroll and Summers (1991) argument. As can be seen in figure 4, it also causes households to save more during middle-age years. Thus, in a high growth regime, consumption is relatively "smoothed" as households borrow substantially in their early, low income years, then save high amounts during middle-age years to pay back for early borrowing as well as amass assets for consumption during later years, when wage income dwindles down to nil.

Growth creates a wealth disparity between cohorts. Thus aggregate saving is influenced by the young generations dissaving much more than by the increased saving of the middle aged cohorts, as Figure 5 demonstrates, and can be seen to be grow up to the 4% growth regime and decrease thereafter.

In addition to failing to provide a persistent strong relation between growth and saving (on the aggregate level) over a range of high growth rates, the baseline model also does not predict an increasing path of household consumption over the lifetime in high growth regimes. This correlation between higher household consumption expenditure growth rates




Figure 3: Saving and investment ratios as a function of the growth rate, baseline life cycle model




Figure 4: Household life cycle expenditure and wage, baseline model




Figure 5: Cross section of household expenditure and wage, baseline model

correlated and higher aggregate growth is demonstrated in both Carroll and Summers (1991) and Lee et al. (2006).

Another counter-factual result of the simulation is the massive gap between the consumption of young and old cohorts. For example, under a regime of 8% per-capita growth, a household of cohort 1 (the head of the household is 25-26) has over 10 times the consumption of a household of cohort 40 (who's head is 59-60). Empirically, as Carroll and Summers (1991) and Lee et al. (2006) show, no such gap exists, and the old cohorts of a rapidly growing economy are no worse off compared to younger cohorts than those of a slowly growing economy.

7.2 Growth Uncertainty

Under growth uncertainty there is a constant probability λ that the economy will drop from its high growth state to an absorbing low growth state. The effect of this drop is of course stronger the larger is the gap between the two states, e.g. a drop from 8% annual per capita growth to 0% is obviously to be dreaded much more than a drop from 4% to 2%. In this simulation the absorbing low growth regime is assumed to be 1% per capita output growth.

Since the state of interest here is that of prolonged high growth, then regardless of the size of λ , the drop to low growth never actually occurs. In other words, while households are forced to plan for low growth eventualities, we are interested only in observing the high growth realizations of this stochastic process. The effect on household saving decisions is twofold: on the one hand it is forced to save toward a future where its income is no longer growing like it used to. This is reminiscent of a precautionary saving motive. On the other hand, since we are observing only the high growth realizations, the household's expected future income is constantly updated upwards, resulting in an ex-post sub-optimal expenditure path where it is borrowing less than it would had its high future income been certain.

As Figure 6 shows, a λ of 5% greatly reduces dissaving during early years in the model. However, the magnifying effect of growth (i.e. young household being so much wealthier) is strong enough that this dissaving eventually overwhelms the increased saving of middle-aged cohorts, as Figure 7 shows, though at higher growth rates than the baseline case, as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 6: Household life cycle expenditure and wage, with growth uncertainty ($\lambda = 5\%$)

Notice also that comparing Figures 4 and 6, it is evident that at 2% growth, uncertainty only generates an extremely minute difference in the household expenditure path. This goes to show that not including the uncertainty element in the process of calibrating q should

produce no major bias.




Figure 7: Cross section of household expenditure and wage, with growth uncertainty ($\lambda = 5\%$)

It can be seen that the presence of uncertainty can be very influential in increasing household saving and decreasing the tendency of the younger cohorts to dissave. A risk of $\lambda = 2\%$, which is extremely low considering it results in an average high growth period of 50 years, is enough to greatly reduce the negative effect of growth on saving in high growth rates. Higher levels of risk further flatten the growth-saving graph (Figure 8), so that, while still decreasing after some point, the simulated saving rate remains much higher for the high values of growth than for the low values.




Figure 8: Saving and growth - a sensitivity analysis for different levels of growth uncertainty

In addition, growth uncertainty further reduces the expenditure gap between young and old cohorts. For example, the ratio of the expenditure of cohorts 1 and 40 is reduced to 3 to 1 under 8% growth. It does not, however, provide increasing life cycle expenditure profiles.

7.3 Credit Constraints

Credit constraints, inhibiting the ability of younger generations to dissave, can have a powerful impact on aggregate saving. As Figure 9 shows, the constraint needs to be quite tight for there to be a significant effect, as $\kappa = -0.1$ is almost identical to $\kappa = -1$ (the no constraint case). Clearly once the younger cohorts are able to borrow 10% of their future wealth the constraints are no longer binding. A non-negativity constraint ($\kappa = 0$) is shown in Figure 9 create a positive effect of growth on saving all the way up to 10% per capita growth (the upper limit of the simulation).

Figure 10 shows the effects of a non-negativity constraint ($\kappa = 0$) on the household's life cycle expenditure. The higher is growth, the longer is the household bound by the constraint. With younger cohorts unable to borrow, the amplifying effect of growth makes the savings of middle-aged cohorts outweigh the dissavings of older cohorts. Notice however that credit constraints element does not lead to an increasing path of life cycle consumption, and thus falls short of matching the data on its own.

Notice also that at 2% per capita growth the range in which the constraints hold is very minimal. Since they do not seem to affect the expenditure path at this growth rate, it is superfluous to include credit constraints in the q calibration process.

As Figure 11 shows, credit constraints also decrease the simulated intra cohort consumption disparity. For example, the ratio of period 1 cohorts and period 40 cohorts expenditure under a growth rate of 8% to be about 2 to 1.




Figure 9: Saving and growth - a sensitivity analysis for different levels of credit constraints




Figure 10: Household life cycle expenditure and wage, with credit constraints ($\kappa = 0\%$)




Figure 11: Cross section of household expenditure and wage, with credit constraints ($\kappa = 0\%$)

7.4 Relative Consumption

With γ set to one, I simulate the effects of utility from relative consumption. As can be seen in Figure 12, the increase in average consumption, caused by economic growth, does indeed lead the households to consume a larger proportion of their income during later years, and to continue to save when young despite their increasing income path. Young cohorts not only not dissave, with higher their period of saving is actually extended to later years in the lifecycle. Utility from relative consumption thus enables the lifecycle model to replicate the correlation between the aggregate growth rate and the growth rate of individual consumption over the lifecycle.

The effect is strong, and substantially changes the aggregate picture, as Figures 13 and 14 demonstrate. Since growth does not reduce the young cohorts' saving behavior, than, just as Modigliani (1970) argues, the higher lifetime wealth of the young compared to the old increases the aggregate saving rate. In addition, as Figure 13 shows, growth does not skew the consumption-age cross section.

Figure 14 shows the effect of growth on the aggregate saving rate with utility from relative consumption ($\gamma = 1$). The effect is different than under the growth uncertainty and credit constraint elements, as the positive effect of growth on saving now extends to higher growth levels instead of tapering out. Notice also that the implication of the results presented in Figure 14 is that slow growth countries should have trade deficits, whereas high growth countries would have surpluses, with a cut-off growth rate of about 5% per capita. It is important to note in this context that this is a partial equilibrium analysis, holding the interest rate constant. Different interest rates would change both the investment and saving rates for the different growth levels, potentially yielding different cut-offs.

These results confirm that utility from relative consumption allows the lifecycle model to simulate well the three stylized facts stated in the introduction: high growth economies enjoy high rates of saving, the shape of the consumption-age cross section is unaltered, and life cycle expenditure profiles increase more with age for higher growth rates. In addition, the




Figure 12: Household life cycle consumption, expenditure and wage, with relative consumption ($\gamma = 1$)




Figure 13: Cross section of household expenditure and wage, with relative consumption ($\gamma = 1$)




Figure 14: Saving and growth with relative consumption ($\gamma = 1$)

simulation demonstrates that with utility from relative consumption high growth economies should hold trade surpluses, as is often the case empirically.




Figure 15: Saving and growth - a sensitivity analysis for different levels of relative consumption (γ)

Figure 15 presents a sensitivity analysis for different levels of γ , from zero (the baseline case) to one. The figure clearly indicates that to get a strong positive relation between economic growth and the saving rate through the relative consumption channel γ needs to be close to one. Results presented in Gruber (2012) suggest this is indeed the case, as it shows relative wealth, rather than absolute wealth, to be the determinant of household saving behavior.

8 Conclusion

When adding the elements of growth uncertainty and credit constraints, the lifecycle model is able to generate positive causality from growth to saving, while allowing growth to fully affect the households income path, overcoming the critique made in Carroll and Summers (1991). However, these two elements fail to replicate the two other stylized facts: the higher rate of increase in life cycle consumption-age profiles for higher growth rates and the similarity in consumption-age cross sections across countries with very different growth rates. Of the three modeling elements presented, only utility from relative consumption presents itself as a viable explanation for all three stylized fact.

In the international context, explaining the high saving rates observed in rapidly growing developing countries also serves toward a better understanding of the direction of capital flows in the world's economy. The excess saving created by growth allows poor but rapidly developing countries to maintain a trade surplus and lend to richer but slower growing economies. With large parts of the world (China, India etc.) poised for a prolonged catching up process, this trend may dominate international capital markets over the next several decades.

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